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AND M R .  BALOGH‘ 
I 
Professor Harris’ latest symposium should be of interest to laymen and 
professional economists alike. Its twentyfour authors cover in twentyfive 
chapters most of the important problems confronting the United States 
in the pursuit of their foreign economic policy. The discussions deal with 
past developments and with the possible desirable future course. All but 
one of the contributors are economists, who know their subjects well and 
often from the inside. iVeedless to say, even those contributors who are 
Government officials speak as private persons rather than as the authors 
or executors of the policies of their respective employers. 
The reviewing of a symposium presents particular difficulties. Short of 
describing the contents of every essay it is impossible to do justice to every 
author. It may therefore be well to state at  the outset that no slight is 
intended for the many essays which can only be mentioned. Inspite of the 
fact that the essays cover a great variety of subjects, some features of 
American economic foreign policy emerge clearly from the reading of the 
book. The foreign economic policy of the United States is complex, and 
its authors are aware of this complexity. What is strikingly evident from 
the book, however, is first that the United States has acquired many 
responsibilities in the world during the last years and decades. This poses 
essentially long-range problems. It emerges secondly that the problem of 
the “dollar shortage” is the most pressing immediate problem although 
some disagreement exists as to whether this is a long run or a short run 
problem. The essays which will be discussed in detail will be primarily 
those dealing with this perplexing problem of the dollar shortage. 
In  a short introductory section the editor discusses the issues of policy 
involved, and Messrs. Thomas C. Blaisdell and E. M. Braderman of the 
( I )  This is a review article of Foreign Economic Policy for the United States, edited 
by Seymour E. Harris, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., I 948. pp. 490 
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US Department of Commerce outline the “Economic Organisation of the 
United States for International Economic Policy”. The second part of the 
book deals with “Individual Country and Area Studies”. Here Anglo- 
American, American-Canadian relations, the German problem, and our 
difficulties in Japan are discussed by John Cassels, Robert Bryce, Kenneth 
Galbraith and Robert Barnett respectively. Their contributions bring 
together the relevant facts both about the economies of the countries 
they are discussing and the problems which confront the United States in 
making up their official minds whenever economic and political consider- 
ations conflict. 
From that standpoint, J. D. Sumner’s chapter on American economic 
relations with China acquires particular relevance in view of the recent 
unpleasant developments in that corner of the globe. For Sumner’s dis- 
cussion leaves no doubt that, economically speaking, the United States 
have no great interest in China. Unless the 400 to 500 Million Chinese are 
expected at  some unspecified future date to become good customers of a 
United States willing to wait that long, it is clear that American economic 
policy towards China was chiefly politically motivated. Similarly, H. C. 
Wallich’s contribution makes it clear that no vital concern of the United 
States lies south of the Rio Grande. 
Mr. Baran’s discussion of the “USSR in the World Economy” claims 
that the Russian attitude towards international trade and international 
co-operation has been on the whole consistent with the general Marxian 
tenets of international and internal social policy. Russia’s isolationism, her 
industrialization and re-armament programs are all designed to protect 
her from anticipated capitalist aggression. These policies need not conflict 
and have, according to the author, paid off during the war since they 
enabled the Soviet Union not only to produce great quantities of war 
materials but also to evacuate her industries relatively smoothly into the 
inner vastnesses of Russia. 
Yet even Mr. Baran finds some puzzles too difficult to solve, although they 
are possibly of minor importance. Why for example did not Russia use 
her reputedly huge gold reserves to finance badly needed additional imports? 
Why did the Soviet Union refuse to join the International Monetary 
Fund or the International Bank? Even the case for Russia not joining the 
proposed International Trade Organization is not entirely convincing. 
Mr Randall Hinshaw, previously known for a calculation (together 
with Lloyd A.Metzler) of the (then) future balance of payments of Great 
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Britain, re-examines the British balance of payments problem in the light 
of the recent American price rises. When the fighting ended in 1945, 
economists stressed the prime importance of the maintenance of high 
employment in the United States. This condition for world stability has 
now been met for three years running, yet the European difficulties have 
remained grave. Mr. Hinshaw points out, correctly in this reviewer’s 
estimation, that Great Britain has very much more to lose if American 
prices and incomes were to fall, than she could gain by it. The high 
American prices have undoubtedly made some aspects of the British 
balance of payments problem more difficult than lower prices would have 
made it. But it is often forgotten that high American prices are, first a 
corollary of high American incomes. Secondly, high American prices 
mean, after all, not only that Britain has to pay more for her imports but 
also that it is easier for her to export. If American imports depended only 
on relative incomes in the United States and abroad, higher prices for both 
and imports would, of course, simply increase any existing deficit in the 
balance of payments. However, American imports are undoubtedly greater 
than they would be otherwise, precisely because prices here are higher. 
I1 
The third part of the book is entitled “International Economic Co-oper- 
ation”. I t  contains chapters on the International Monetary Fund and the 
International Bank of Reconstruction and Development by A. G. B. Fisher; 
on the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade negotiated in Geneva in 
I 948 by W. G. Brown; a discussion of the International Trade Organization 
by H.G.Hawkins which needs little change inspite of the fact that it was 
written before the end of the Havana Conference. I should like, however, 
to concentrate on Mr. Gutt’s discussion of “Exchange Rates and the 
International Monetary Fund” (pp. 2 I 7-235). 
Mr. Camille Gutt is the Chairman of the Executive Board and the 
Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund. His contribution 
is a candid and often convincing discussion of the reasons which have 
induced the officials of the International Monetary Fund to accept ex- 
change rates which were manifestly not correct, and in general of the 
reasoning underlying the Fund’s decisions. Mr. Gutt does not evade the 
problems and points out that the Fund has not evaded them. Theremay 
simply not have been any “correct” exchange rate in 1946. When the 
Fund accepted the proposed exchange rates it simply “wanted to know 
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whether the prevailing exchange rate would handicap a country in re- 
building its economy and in securing an orderly adjustment to its new 
international economic position” (p. 22 I ) .  As long as the exchange rate did 
not seem to handicap exports of available goods and enabled countries to 
import it was accepted regardless of whether it was considered a reasonable 
rate in the long run. “At least until the last of 1947 the initial parities do 
not seem to have been a handicap to members of the Fund in expanding 
their total exports” (p. 221). Therefore, Mr. Gutt believes that “if the 
necessary changes are made promptly, the wisdom of the original action 
will be supported” (p.221). 
Mr. Gutt makes a good case for not having accepted alternative 
policies at the time. In particular, as long as American aid is available 
(a qualification not mentioned by the author) it is obviously useless to 
establish an exchange rate parity forcing countries already desperately 
short of goods to export more. Of course, parities should be changed when 
necessary. And of course internal monetary policies should not be such as 
to jeopardize through later developments any parity which might at the 
time of its setting have been quite reasonable. Yet Mr. Gutt recognizes 
explicitely that “if there have been delays in getting an obviously necess- 
ary change in the parity of one of the major currencies, the French franc, 
it is because political disturbances prevented such measures from being 
taken earlier ...’7 (p.224). 
Needless to say, this brief account does not do full justice to Mr.Gutt’s 
important essay. But it ought to have served to draw the attention of the 
interested reader to the existence of this most authoritative interpretation 
of the International Monetary Fund’s actions. 
At the same time the interested reader is referred to an important 
criticism by Professor Bresciani-Turroni of Mr. Gutt’s comments on the 
“disorderly cross rates” which have recently arisen with respect to the 
dollar, the pound, and the French franc. Professor Bresciani-Turroni’s 
analysis ( I )  shows that “In a free market this discrepancy between direct 
and cross rates derives necessarily from the existence of bilateral trade 
relations (2)”. 
Bresciani-Turroni points out that “the deformation of trade is not the 
consequence of disorderly cross rates. On  the contrary, it is the deform- 
( I )  Banco di Roma, Review of the Economic Conditions in Italy, V01.11 
No.3, May 1948, PP. 147-155 
(2) 0 p . d  p. 151. The passage quoted is italicized in the original. 
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ation of trade currents, caused by bilateral agreements, that renders a 
general equilibrium of foreign exchange rates impossible” (p. I 53) .  “Dis- 
orderly” cross rates will actually tend to correct at least partially the 
dollar shortage which is the basis for their existence. Therefore, Professor 
Bresciani-Turroni concludes that “ ... the solution of the problem is not to 
be found in an intensifying of controls with a view of achieving a monetary 
balance which, I repeat, I consider impossible as things are at present. 
A solution of the monetary problem is only to be reached through a more 
extensive and intensive cooperation among the Governments in order to 
do away with bilateral agreements replacing them with commercial treaties 
facilitating the creation of a multilateral system, in the spirit of the recent 
Havana Convention” (p. I 55). 
I11 
The fourth part of the book deals with the European Recovery Program. 
Here we meet our one non-economist, Kirtley F.Mather who discusses 
“American Resources in Relation to Europe’s Needs” from the geologist’s 
standpoint. Calvin Hoover’s discussion of “What Can Europe Do For It- 
self” and Sidney Alexander’s discussion of “Europe’s Needs and Prospects” 
are both based largely on the Paris reports of the sixteen participating 
nations, the Harriman report and other American documents. Lincoln 
Gordon contributes a penetrating account of the administrative problems 
involved in the formulation of policies for the European Recovery 
Program. 
In a brief but penetrating chapter, Professor Edward S .  Mason considers 
the European Recovery Program in the political context of American 
foreign policy. He argues convincingly that American-Russian relations 
ought to improve as the European Recovery Program succeeds. Obviously, 
world peace depends on how these two great nations get along. Professor 
Mason finds Russian behaviour as consistent as did Mr. Baran, although 
possibly for slightly different and to this reviewer more convincing 
reasons. “Whatever else the Russians lack ... they do not lack a sense of 
history. In fact they have, ready made, a ‘scientific’ interpretation of 
history which is not only equipped to explain the past but to predict the 
future. This interpretation of history tells them that time is working on 
their side. And if time is working on their side, why should they yield in 
negotiation to-day that which the inevitable course of events will bring 
them to-morrow?’’ (p. 292.) Thus Professor Mason concludes: “Under 
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these circumstances, the only effective line of action open to us is to at- 
tempt, ourselves, to influence the course of events. To  me this is primary 
significance of the new approach of American foreign policy. If the 
Marshall Program is successful and the participating countries are firmly 
established on the road to recovery, we may reasonably expect to see the 
increasing stability and strength of democratic governments not only in 
Europe but elsewhere in the world. If and when this happens, we may also 
reasonably expect to see a change in the Soviet forecast, with consequent 
improvement in the prospect of achieving agreement through the process 
of negotiation. After all, this would not be the first time, that Soviet 
truculence based on a faulty forecast has given way to sweet reasonableness 
once the falseness of the forecast has been demonstrated by the course of 
events” (p. 292/3). 
IV 
The final part of the book deals essentially with the problem of the so- 
called dollar shortage. Its contributors are Hansen, Haberler, Samuelson, 
Triffin and Balogh. All authors have much to say. For the theorist as well 
as for the practitioner this section is apt to be most interesting as well as the 
most irritating one. For it is impossible not to be irritated either by Pro- 
fessor Haberler (who is not quite as “orthodox” as Mr.Harris in an 
editorial comment suggests) or by Mr. Balogh. This reviewer’s irritations 
all stem from Mr. Balogh’s contribution for reasons which will be spelled 
out in detail below. 
Samuelson argues that adjustments in the exchange rates would not 
have by themselves abolished the “dollar shortage”. In  fact he insists that 
“one can hardly argue that the very real problem of ‘universal’ dollar 
shortage arose primarily out of differential price movements of the usual 
sort. The reverse is, in my opinion, more nearly true” (p.399). Whether 
or not this is so can be left open here although Samuelson is, of course, 
certainly right in stressing the point that the relation between price move- 
ments and the foreign exchanges are not all one way. Samuelson then argues 
that “the equilibrating efficacy of exchange rate variations does not 
depend upon each of the two countries having an elastic demand. The 
critical question is now recognized to be whether the sum of the two 
elasticities-the ‘net elasticity’-is greater than unity” (p. 404). 
On  the other hand, Samuelson points out (what is perhaps selfevident), 
that as long as rich countries are willing to lend to poorer countries they 
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can undersell them (in a particular sense of the word) in every line of 
endevour-the theory of comparative cost notwithstanding. To which 
need only be added that the theory of comparative cost would still show 
which particular goods the creditor country should and would export. 
Samuelson further insists that it is “natural” for poor countries to go into 
debt to rich countries, and that it is equally “natural” for them to default. 
I t  may be asked whether it is also “natural” that the rich country should 
continue to lend even if the poor countries default periodically. 
This account is historically more or less correct for, say, the past hundred 
years. At present Europe evidently is poor and the United States are rich, 
and they are willing for a variety of reasons not only to lend but to give. 
Ergo ... In  any case, while monetary mismanagement undoubtedly is part 
of the story of the dollar shortage, it is not quite the whole story. 
Now Professor Haberler, who is represented by two contributions takes, 
of course, a line which inspite of its supposed orthodoxy is not so very 
different. In  fact, it should not be too difficult to reconcile this “ortho- 
doxy” of Haberler and the “unorthodoxy” of Samuelson ( I ) .  No one who 
has recently been in Europe can possibly deny that the root cause of the 
European troubles are not monetary alone. 
But from that it hardly follows that monetary mismanagement is even 
largely irrelevant. In  particular, Professor Haberler points out that the 
situation is quite different for different countries. For Greece or Germany 
balanced international accounts now without American aid would mean 
starvation and chaos. For England and France, however, this is by no 
means certain although it is certain that to balance their foreign accounts 
now without American aid would involve a lowered standard of living 
immediately and possibly through a less ambitious investment program, 
also in the future. “It is economically very fortunate and socially and 
politically imperative that through the Marshall plan the transition to a 
balanced trade position be prolonged or postponed for some time, but 
economically speaking for Western Europe, foreign aid (and loans) is no 
longer a question of life and death as it is for the first mentioned group of 
countries” (p. 434). 
( I )  It might be noted in passing that the most “orthodox” contribution to 
his section comes surprisingly from the pen of Professor A. H. Hansen who most 
nearly insists on the formulation and usefulness for purposes of exchange rate 
determination of a purchasing power parity theory which is based on cost-price 
relationships. 
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One could perhaps go even further than Professor Haberler does. It 
seems often implied not only that in France, to take an example, anti- 
inflationary measures would not do much good to avoid a “permanent” 
dollar shortage (which is doubtful but conceivable) but that somehow 
France is enabled to consume and/or invest more than she could if she ap- 
plied herself more assiduously to slightly sounder finances. But this is 
obviously nonsense. The first law of economics is that one cannot eat more 
than one has (including one’s capital). France cannot consume and/or 
invest a bit more than her own resources and the additional resources she 
can get through Marshall aid and so forth, permit. When Mr.Harrod, for 
example insisted that Britain was trying to do too much, this can hardly be 
denied: overambitious plans will be limited either by the “dollar shortage” 
and exchange controls, or by means of disinflation as the strange twin of 
reflation is nowadays called. The bad effects of inflation, whether sup- 
pressed or open, are such that it needs to be proved that the gains of ex- 
change control are greater than the losses of inflation. I am neither a 
deflationist nor an anti-exchange control advocate under all circum- 
stances; what Europe has seen in recent years, however, goes undoubtedly 
beyond any reasonable and justifiable degree of control. 
When it comes to countries like Sweden, Canada, Argentina, or Austra- 
lia, all of whom have not suffered directly from the war but like the United 
States have developed further (Mr.Balogh take note!) it is obviously im- 
possible not to agree with Professor Haberler that “these countries suffer 
from a balance of payments deficit bur et simple, unaccompanied by the 
alleged impossibility of living within their means” (p. 434). Th‘ is seems so 
obviously true that “unorthodox” economists tend to overlook this aspect 
of the problem. Professor Haberler could have strengthened his case by a 
reference to Switzerland which does not suffer from a dollar shortage 
although she is in a rather more difficult position than, say, Sweden, 
which does. 
Thus Professor Haberler concludes that “the classical, inflation theory 
of the dollar shortage is substantially correct”. But “it would be a serious 
misunderstanding to believe that the problem is simple or easy to solve, 
because we have reduced it to a short formula” (p.444). 
In  fact, both Haberler and Samuelson can be reconciled as far as their 
theoretical statements are concerned. The following picture of a “perma- 
nent” dollar shortage might be constructed. European nations have lost 
much of their productive power through the war, but their people have 
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not yet adapted their consumption pattern to their new poverty and aim 
at a prewar standard or even higher. They refuse to save enough. In  order 
to make ends meet, nationally as well as internationally, rationing and ex- 
change controls have to be used. 
It might further be argued that the traditional anti-inflationary policies 
would not do much good as long as this desire to maintain or improve 
prewar consumption levels continues. Such policies would undoubtedly 
reduce prices and incomes in terms of domestic currencies, but they might 
conceivably reduce only the numtraire of the Walrasian system. That is, 
the consumption function in real terms might remain just where it was, 
which was too high. While the price mechanism may fail to depress the 
consumption function or may do so only at the cost of a politically and 
socially intolerable redistribution of incomes, rationing and exchange 
control will necessarily succeed. 
This is a theoretical construct which is undoubtedly conceivable al- 
though I should not consider its real existence very probable. In  any case 
it involves questions of f a c t  about which legitimate differences of opinion 
may exist. 
V 
It is also my duty to review Mr.Balogh’s contribution on “The US and 
International Economic Equilibrium”. I t  is not easy to understand why 
Mr.Harris has chosen to conclude his symposium with this essay. Mr. 
Balogh is the only English contributor. But it would be most unfortunate 
if this fact led the reader to believe that Balogh represents the English 
viewpoint. In  fact, neither the British Government nor British Economists 
from the late Lord Keynes to Hicks and Harrod agree any more with him 
than do most American economists and for the same reasons. Mr. Bdogh’s 
contribution is a mixture of brilliant and bad analysis, of illegitimate ap- 
plication of this analysis to alleged facts, and of special pleading to permit 
England with impunity to behave in a Schachtian way which is not less 
evil because it applies to England and comes from a fellow of Balliol 
College, Oxford. 
These are serious charges which must be substantiated. Balogh starts out 
with a review of the assumptions of the classical theory of international 
trade. Among them he mentions casually that “the balance of payments 
must be in equilibrium in the sense that income and outlay are equal” 
(p. 447). This, however, is not an assumption but an equilibrium condition. 
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I t  is true that cyclical considerations were not taken into account by the 
earlier classical economists, but this hardly justifies the statement that 
‘there would be no level of exchange which would both balance the 
country’s international payments and permit the maintenance of full 
employment” (p. 448). This would be an important point if true. If Balogh 
had been content to state that no one has thus far produced a proof that 
full employment is possible simultaneously in all countries at specific ex- 
change rates and without exchange control, he would have been more 
nearly correct. But even then most economists would think that the burden 
of proof lay with Mr. Balogh. 
“We have seen” Mr. Balogh continues “that once the possibility of a 
serious deflationary instability in an important member country of the 
system is admitted, multilateral schemes cannot a prior; be expected to 
secure optimum progress for all members of a world system” (p.445). This 
may be so, but it would require some discussion of the meaning of optimum 
progress, and it would require proof on Mr. Balogh’s part. Neither have 
been given. But suppose, for arguments sake, that Mr. Balogh’s assertion 
be correct and suppose that we agree also that “if we apply the modern 
theory to the balances of payments we must immediately recognize how 
vastly important is the size and especially the relative size of units” 
(p. 451). If  a country is big enough “an inffow or outflow of gold will not 
enforce a change in monetary policy. Nor will the income effects which 
give rise to these gold movements ... significantly alter, or cause a country 
to alter, its own national income because of its preponderance in the total 
world money income” (p. 445). Thus Mr. Balogh concludes “the larger 
the ‘leading’ country and its national income relative to the world, the 
greater its instability relative to that of the world, the more fluid its cost 
structure and the more important its products, the greater will be the 
instability of the system as a whole” (p.453). 
All of this obviously applies to the United States and probably only to the 
United States. I t  is an interesting analysis and may become quite relevant 
at some future date. I t  possibly overestimates the importance of America 
in the world. It overlooks the fact that the United States might be willing, 
for reasons of international cooperation, to pursue voluntarily monetary 
policies into which it cannot be forced. But how is this relevant to the im- 
mediate problem? Since the end of the war no instability, nor any 
depressing influence, has emanated from the United States. Yet Mr. 
Balogh simply rephrases what he wrote in 1946 in anticipation of a de- 
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pression in the United States. Perhaps he will be correct in the future. 
Perhaps the United States will have a depression. But the point is that for 
the past three years she has not. This does not prevent the author from 
writing: “It is thus not true that it is mereb stability in the United States 
(and other large economic units) that is required for a smooth working of 
a multilateral international system, but stability at high employment. A long 
depression in one country-if the country is big enough-is a perpetual 
menace to the world economic system, because of the direct and indirect 
(psychological) pressure it exerts on other countries” (pp. 457/8. Italics in 
the original). 
An impartial observer would think that a stable high level of production 
and employment is exactly what we have had in this country for the past 
three to four years. He might even agree with Dr.Balogh that because of 
the importance of the domestic economy of the United States “the possi- 
bility of influencing the United States level of employment by export sur- 
pluses had practically vanished ... the existence of a relatively large surplus 
in her balance of payments will hardly have any effect on her internal 
position” (p. 458). But this is rather difficult to reconcile with the statement 
found only two pages later where the European Recovery Program is 
suggested to have helped save the day for the American economy! 
In reality, of course, the facts do not support Mr. Balogh even if we ac- 
cept his second view. For the European Recovery expenditures were made 
at a time when the Federal budget ran a surpZus of $ 8 billion and more 
over and above ERP expenditures, armaments, and the rest of the “day 
saving” expenditures. And in addition, inflationary pressures continued 
even with so large a budget surplus. Surely the ERP expenditures ac- 
complished nothing for the American economy which a tax reduction 
could not have done equally well. 
But Mr. Balogh is not content to show the dire consequences to the world 
of an American depression. Nor is he content simply to ignore the fact 
that during the past three years and more the American economy has ful- 
filled all the conditions he postulates for a successfully working inter- 
national economy. The world still experiences considerable difficulties, 
but “stability a t  high employment” in the United States does not exoner- 
ate this country. His attitude towards the United States that “heads I win, 
tails you lose” is beautifully illustrated by the following arguments: If the 
United States should experience a depression the world would be unable 
to export enough to America. Would an American boom help in this 
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respect? Not a bit. Prices have risen faster than wages, reconversion has 
proceded faster than anticipated, employment is at an all time high for 
peace times. The conclusion from all this is not, as one would expect, that 
this has provided at least temporary relief for a dollar starved world. On the 
contrary, the author concludes in the very next sentence: “Only a pro- 
longed series of strikes could produce a situation in which foreign countries 
would be safe from United States competition. This is at least unlikely, 
especially in view of the trend of Congressional opinion” (p. 4 6 0 ) .  
Having assured us that both booms and depressions in the United 
States are equally harmful to the world and that only a high and sus- 
tained level of strikes in this country can save the world from American 
competition, Mr. Balogh continues: “Yet even if such a complicated system 
of multilateral discrimination” (as envisaged by the International Trade 
Charter and amended by Mr. Balogh) “were to be accepted by the United 
States, it still seems important to emphasize that, without obtaining per- 
mission for long-term reciprocal purchase agreements, or other preferential 
agreements, Western Europe will not be able to insure real stability nor will 
it be able to create really large-scale and secured markets. Even ifAmerican 
instability is guarded against, the principle of nondiscrimination as app- 
lied by the Havana Charter will tend to perpetuate the present superiority 
of the United States in relation to other industrial exporters” (p. 474). 
This statement and its implications are grossly unfair and run counter 
to the known facts. In the councils of the European Recovery Program, is 
not the United States urging the European nations to get together? To be 
sure, sufficient instances of peculiar behavior on the part of American 
authorities can be found to make the United States appear considerably 
less than perfect. Nevertheless, it is not correct that the United States 
would not accept anything short of complete customs unions, as Mr. 
Balogh implies at a later place. Indeed Mr.Harold Wilson did not 
complain about the United States but rather about France for preferring 
to import goods available in Great Britain from the United States where 
they could be had as a gift. I t  would seem then that only the cutting off of 
American aid would force European unity! I t  is rather difficult to see how 
special privileges would create anything but a greater division of Europe 
rather than a larger market. 
I t  is therefore rather odd to read “it is this persistent discrimination 
against efforts to establish a large-scale economic territory in Europe and 
its complementary areas capable of development on the basis of long- 
172 W. F. S T O L P E R  
contained in the postwar agreements” (p.477/8). It is surely libelous to 
term planning (and the permission to form full customs unions is both 
impractical and irrelevant) which is the real threat against our future 
state and to imply that “the fact that neither the General Agreement nor 
the Charter outlaws tied loans-a most powerful and discriminating 
means to promote exports-shows that the United States, well aware of 
its war-promoted superiority, means to retain it” (p. 478). 
I t  can hardly have escaped Mr. Balogh, first, that tied loans form only 
a minute part of American loans. He must have known, secondly, that the 
United States encourages maximum spending of ERP dollars abroad ( I ) .  
In  any case, as long as everyone wants dollars a tying provision would be 
irrelevant anyway. Furthermore, if the United States is as superior in all 
respects as Balogh says, it obviously needs no permission to make tied 
loans, and such a permission would aid rather Great Britain to maintain 
her exports against this supposed general, universal and inevitably growing 
American superiority. 
It can, finally, be categorically stated that not one nation, not even 
Great Britain, proposed either at London, or a t  Geneva, or at Havana to 
outlaw tied loans, and that this question was never raised at any of these 
conferences. Coming after the $ 3% billion untied loan to Great Britain, 
and considering the off-shore purchase provisions of the Marshall Plan 
aid, this statement is particularly difficult to understand. 
Inspite of his scientific guise, Mr. Balogh pleads a case for British policies 
of discrimination. He does not seem to care whether he uses arguments 
which are internally or mutually consistent; he does not apparently care 
whether his facts are correct or relevant. The application of the arguments, 
even when the arguments by themselves are sound, is often illegitimate.The 
insinuations are tactless and without foundation. It is painful to watch a 
good mind misused. By concluding this distinguished volume with Dr. 
Balogh’s paper, Mr. Harris has cast him in the natural r d e  ofaduocatus diaboli. 
University of Michigan 
Ann Arbor, Michigan 
W. F. STOLPER 
( I )  I t  is unfortunately true that half of the purchases made in the United States 
with ERP dollars should be shipped in American vessels. This provision does not, 
however, apply to offshore purchases. Shipping done in American ships must be 
at world market rates. And in any case, there is no requirement that a single ERP 
dollar be spent within the United States. 
